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Labor Market  Institutions, Constraints, arid  Performance 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the changes in labor market institutions and outcomes 
across (ECD countries in the past two decades and relates indicators of the 
institutions to outcomes.  It has four findings.  First, there has been  an 
increased divergence in  labor market institutions, with  unionisation growing or 
remaining at high  levels of  density in  some countries while declining in 
others.  Second, changes in the two major outcomes on  which analysts and policy- 
makers  focus --  employment and real wages  -- are  substantially negatively 
correlated  across countries, conditional on  growth of  GDP.  Countries that had 
rapid growth of  employment in the l9]Os or  1980s, and high  employment to 
working age population rates, such as the U.S. or  Sweden, had relatively slow 
Crowth of real wages; while by  contrast countries with relatively slow growth 
of employment, such as Spain, had rapid growth of real wages,  indicative of a 
labor demand  type constraint on  outcomes,  Third, there is a moderate nonlinear 
relation between labor market outcomes and institutions: countries with either 
relatively centralized wage-setting (as evidenced by little inter-industry 
dispersion of  wages)  such as the Scandinavian countries and countries with 
decentralized wage-setting  (as  indicated by  high  inter-industry dispersion of 
wages) had  better performances in  employment than countries with  intermediate 
types of labor market structures and institutions. Fourth, even  among countries 
with  comparable institutions, there is a considerable diversity of performance. 
Richard B. Freeman 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
A Labor Market  Institutions, Constraints, and Economic Performance 
The labor market experiences of  advanced economies diverged sharply in the 
1970s and l980s: employment increased  in North America, Australia, and  Japan 
while  stagnating  in  many western European  countries;  real wages grew  rapidly  in 
most  OECD  countries but not in  the United  States, then generally stabilized  or 
declined but not in  the United Kingdom.  Many  analysts  (largely European) blame 
Europe's stagnant employment  on union policies and government  labor regulations 
that reduce wage  and employment  flexibility and extol the US  as the paragon of 
a flexible efficient market.  Other observers  (largely American) bemoan  the 
slow  growth  of productivity  and shift of jobs to low wage industries in  the US 
and  view  Japan  as the exemplar economy.  Still other analysts blame high 
unemployment  on  decentralized wage-setting  that permits real wage  growth 
despite joblessness  and see a solution  in Swedish-style  'corporatism' 
Do labor market  institutions in OECD  countries  differ sufficiently  to have 
caused the observed differences  in economic performances of the 1970s-l980s? 
Do  claims  that labor market  flexibility, unionism,  centralised  or decentralized 
wage-setting  affect outcomes stand up to critical investigation? 
To answer  these questions  I  analyse data  on changes in wages and 
employment  pooled  across countries and industries and relate  these changes to 
indicators of  the institutional structures  of  labor markets.  In the first 
section I compare two indicators of  labor market  arrangements 
-  -  union density 
and  dispersion  of  wages  among industries 
- -  and  find  large differences  and 
increasing  polarization  among OECD  countries,  as  some countries have moved  to 
near universal unionisation/collective  bargaining  coverage and narrow wage 
differentials  while others have  moved to weak  unionism and wider  differentials. 
In the second section I document the existence  of a substantial  tradeoff 
between growth  of  employment and  real  wages across  countries and industries. 2 
in  the third section  I  relate measures of  performance to labor market  structure 
and find that economios at the extremes  -  -  with highly centralized or  highly 
decentralised  labor msrket  arrangements 
-  -  had better  employment  records than 
economies  'betwixt and  between'  .  While this is consistent with  theories that 
decentralized  and highly  structured  labor markets may produce similar outcomes 
(Olson,1982; Calmfors and  Driffill),  there is sufficient diversity  in outcomes 
among countries  to indicate thst specific institutional arrangements  are 
neither necessary  nor sufficient  for adoption of  employment-creating  policies. 
I.  Differences  in  Labor Markets:  Union Density and Wage  Structures 
Labor market  institutions, wage-setting systems, and the wage structures 
that reflect those systems changed  in different wsys in  developed countries  in 
the lPiOs and lPSOs.  The proportion  of workers represented by  unions  fell in 
the US, Japan, and, after  a period of  growth, in the UK and Netherlands  while 
increasing  or  stabilizing in  most OECD  countries.  Wage differentials by 
industry and skill, which historically narrow  with  develop-ment,  rose in  some 
countries  but not in  those with  centralized wage setting. 
Union  density/collective  bargaining  representation 
Table  1 records figures on  the proportion of  nonagricultural  wage  and 
salary  workers in  the traditionally  most important labor market  institution in 
capitalism 
-- trade  unions.  As unionism has different meanings  across  settings 
(it reflects representation  at the company level and the Shunto  offensive  in 
Japan;  collective bargaining  to a  written agreement in  the US; national  wage- 
aerting  in  Scandinavia, etc.) and is measured differently  (1), the figures 
mhould  be viewed  as crude  indicators of  patterns and changes.  The question 
marks  next to France and Italy reflect the particularly weak  measures of 
unionisation  in those countries  (2),  though data for other countries  are also 
imperfect.  In  Australia  the arbitration wage-setting  system places  unions at 
the center  of  wage determination  despite moderate density.  In  the UK the drop Table  1:  Levels  and Changes in Union Density as a percent of 
Non Agricultural  Wage and Salary Employees Across  Countries,  1970-85 
Countries  with  Sharp Rises  in Density 
1970  1979  1984/5  1970-79  1979-85 
66  86  98  +20 
56  84  85  +23 
79  89  95  +10 
66  77  --  +11 
Countries  with  Moderate Rises  in Density 
Countries  with Stable/Declinj7g_Density 
Norway 
United  Kingdom 
Austria  * 
Japan  * 
Netherlands 
United  States 
59  60  61 
51  58  52 
64  59  61 
35  32  29 
39  43  37 
31  25  18 
+1  +1 
+7  -6 
-5  +2 
-  3  -3 
+4  -6 
-  6  -7 
53  54 
19  22 
36  40 
Note: Union  Density as a percent of nonagricultural wage and salary employees. 
Source:  U.S.  Department of  Labor,  Bureau of  Labor Statistics,  Office of 
Productivity  and  Technology,  Division of  Foreign Labor  Statistics  and Trade, 
July 1986.  Center for Labour Economics OECD  Data  Set upcaated  with  respective 
Country  Statistical  Abstracts. 
a) My  figures on  density 'isagree with  those of  WK Foche  and Joe Larragy  (1987) 
because  they  divide union  membership  by labor force while  I divide by 
employment. 






Italy  (7) 
Germany 






39  51  45  +12  -  6 
37  42  42  + 5  0 
22  28  28  + 6  0 
31  36  35  ÷5  -1 
32  36  37  + 4  ÷ 1 
52  58  57  + 6  -  1 
43  46  .-  ÷ 3  -- 
44  49  51  + 5  + 2 
Mean 
Standard  Deviation 
Coeficient  of  Variation 
15 
32 
No Change in  union share of total employment 
employment. 
due to fall in  agriculture epresentation  exceeds  tier shown  in  the ThIle  because official union 
tatis0i,s appear  to  exaggerate rerborship in  tie rid 1980a  (1,.  In  the US 
nrivae  sector density plurrctetted to 14% in  1924, with total density falling 
less beca'se unloina organized  traditiorallv nonunion public  sector  workers. 
Theee  and ohet  xseas cozen:  issuec notwithrtanding  Table I  reveals  a 
clear divergence it unioricatior rates  actors  countries that  is unlikely to 
change with better daa,  Frs 1970 to  1179 dreita :noteaset  in  many 
nr:c, with riser ci In r  core point: i  five.  nu° declined  in  h'  If 
tpan  ann Puo:ie  Proc 1970 o 1921  oenaity  stabilized  in n  st oo-jntriee 
bc°  rr:p7c:  srp  the  '72, 'KThpsr  nd t  Netherlands.  Ciff0rert 
'----en  ---'.  v't  °otm ouraI raits  10 and Ce-'ada,  ?olg'un  ao 
fir' ,lan°s  :' ond  Trefind  ennw  'es t' e  flanging untonisatlon 
ruo ett' anne  -  -  epe  -te devclrpee's  oa°tg  oountties with dIfferent 
fotca of  cnio—Ioir  :  a result of the dIvergent  trenos  the orefffiiect of 
;eclation in  4r _siy  r:eascd  from  0  02  in 1970 to  OcO  in 198: 
efvaaC5-n'r.4lrdu5trles 
10t: rr,,k  tnotl nti'ns  ,azaif ot age 0°d  mgI  'rn—t  utr  me 
lIe': -11:-'-;'  of :e-& -vs  wee  :  nrn  it'  pt  0 u:tker  -1'. 
v  -ku  --  r  otinc dimensions  Recent  discussion of flexihil.1 II ha 
fn  '•u-o-L  - rh  ii'--  cr1 :n -—f  wares  errors in 'us'-r es  I Nfl 192 1997a,  -  wI°n 
rne:ys'c  viewins  '-ncs wish greater dirpersior  as being more  flexiole.  ic 
ntrn i' chat  deoen'railzed flcxubse  wage setting allows  unduatry-sperff 
fsctora  aodoue  greater I  nduatty dfferenoea nhen is  alloaed by acre 
cent:  eli cdlnettcutiona  4)  Following t  is line of thinking,  in this  ;egec I 
use  fortcrry wsge ds  rson cc  an 5odfiattr cf labor 'natket  so"  route.  I 
ion by aoend:cd do' :  i a  :a of In  wage"  ftc:. ii- r  data  se°s:  the 
'Jnired  N,-";  o'e  f r"c - f  ndun cial  Statistics;  a  data iil° from thc 
Euroean cc .n"uf-  "oootc4ty  Eurrsnai  figures;  the  International  lsbot Table  2:  Variances  of Ln Industry Earnings  (xlOO) 
Anion  OECD  Countries  1970-86 





Decreasing  Dispersion 
24 
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25  -  26 
24  -  25 
24  -  26 
21  -  22 
25 -  28 
26  -  29 
22  -  26 
21  -  25 
High/Increasing  Dispersion 
23  -  28  — —  28  -  33 
25-26  25-28 
21  -  25 
21  -  27 
Increasing  Dispersion 
17 -  21  — - 
20  -  27  16 
-  16  17  -  20 
21  -  24  —  — 
19  -  25  —  —  — — 
Moderate/Stable  Dispersion 
25 -  24  18 -  17  24  -  30 
22  -  21  16 -  16  — — 
19  -  20  12  -  13  23  -  23 
—  —  e  13  -  11  29  -  23 
Italy  32 





15 -  14 
12 -  13 
17 -  15 a.  Data for Netherlands  and Belgium for 1985. 
b.  N.  Zealand  data from national  statisical  source shows increase  in 
dispersion  from  13 
-  17. 
c.  Australia  Reports too few industries for results to be ttustworthy. 
d,  Males  only. 
e.  Netherlands  has  figures for 17 industrtes, with  diap of 41 in 1973 and 29 
in  1983. 
f.  Switzerland  figures for males, with  diap  of 8  in 1975 and 11 in  1984. 
g.  Italy's  figures for 1982 based  on  a smaller  number of  industries. 
h.  Klau and Mittelstadt  show  a decline in dispersion  in France  from 1966 to 
1982 from 155 to 133 based  on  data from the Swedish Employer's  Federation. Organizations's  Yearbook of  Labor Statistics;  and the US Bureau  of  Labor 
Statistic's  International Comparisons of  Hourly Compensation  Costs for 
Production Workers  in Manufacturing.  The data  differs in several ways: UN  and 
EEC figures are wage  and salary  bills divided by total employment;  the ILO and 
Eurostat  data are hourly earnings; while  the BLS measures hourly  compensation. 
The number  of industries varies by data  set and in  some instances by country 
within  a data  Set (5). Service industries are under-represented.  As usual with 
international  comparative  data, moreover,  the data trade-off comparability 
among countries  for accuracy about any particular  country.  The purpose  of 
examining  several data  sets is to  enable me to  differentiate patterns  that are 
robust  across  sources and thus more likely to be  valid  from patterns  that 
result from  peculiarities  in  a particular  data set. 
Table 2 summarizes  the results of my  calculations, with  countries  grouped 
by the level and change in  dispersion  in  the l97Os-early  l9BOs and with the 
variances  multiplied  by 100 for ease of  presentation.  Despite differences 
among data, the table reveals abroad similarity  in  dispersion  that 
differentiates  between countries where  pay is centrally determined  (i.e.  the 
Scandinavian  countries)  and countries with  decentralized wage-setting  (US, 
Japan,  etc.).  The table also  shows  that dispersion  increased in  the US, Japan, 
Canada, New  Zealand, Australia,  and possibly Norway; decreased markedly  in 
Italy; but did not change  in most  other countries.  As the historic  pattern is 
for wage  differentials  to narrow  or  at least not increase, the rise  has 
attracted  attention  (see Bell  and Freeman,l985; Lawrence and Lawrence,1986). 
The most aberrant figures are from the EEC file, whose  calculated  dispersions 
for Italy and France  are out of  line with those from  other sources,  though 
showing similar changes over time, and those for Norway, which  is rated high in 
dispersion  in  the UN data  but low in ILO data. other wage differentials 
As  a check on  the extent to which industry wage dispersion reflects the 
overall wage-setting system in a country I have also examined pay differentials 
by skill, sex,  and age,  and find that they follow patterns similar to industry 
differentials.  Consider, for example, the patterns of  change in skill premia. 
During  the 1970s premia by  years of  schooling or  occupation narrowed in  moat 
developed countries, often substantially, as the influx of  young educated 
workers created by the baby boom and post-world war II expansion of  higher 
education reduced the pay of  the more educated (Freeman,198l).  The 1980s 
experience has been more varied: education and white collar/manual pay ratios 
widened sharply in the U.S. and U.K. to pre-l970s levels while maintaining 
levels much narrower than in the early l970s in  many  other OECD countries 
(Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Australia, Finland, and Japan, according to 
OECD, 1987b).  As for differentials by sex,  the ratio of female to male pay is 
higher  and increased more in economies with centralized wage-setting such as 
Sweden or  with  special centralized features such as Australia than in 
decentralized economies such as the U.S. (Gregory and Ho,l985; OECD,1985). 
Finally, differentials by  age also changed across countries, steepening in the 
U.S. and some other countries with baby-boom induced increases in  the supply of 
young workers, narrowing in Japan, which had a shortfall of youth, while 
remaining stable in countries with centralized wage-setting (Bloom and Freeman, 
1986; OECD,l984; Leroy,1987).  In short, the pattern of  wage differentials 
along dimensions other than industry across countries is sufficiently similar 
to  that in industry differentials to make  industry dispersion a reasonable 
indicator of  differences in  overall  wage-setting systems. 
When  one  contrasts specific countries with  less pronounced-  institutional 
differences, however, these broad-based measures can be  misleading.  Consider, 
for instance,-relative wage  flexibility by  geographic area  in  the US, which 6 
ranks low in  unionism arid high  in  dispersion in  Tables 1 and  2 and  is generally 
viewed  as the archetypal flexible labor market and in the UK, which ranks in 
the middle of  the unionism category and has a modestly narrower industry wage 
structure,  As can be seen in  Table 3,  in  the US wages are high  in  areas of 
high  unemployment and show little response to increases in  unemployment whereas 
in the UK  wages declined in the 1980s in high unemployment areas,  These 
patterns  imply greater rather than smaller responsiveness of  pay to area 
unemployment in  the UK.  Relative pay by  skill and age also appear to have been 
no less flexible in the UK  than in  the US in the 1980s,  with  premium rising in 
both  countries, as noted earlier.  The implication is that while dispersion, 
union density, and other broad indicators of  labor market  institutions may 
accurately reflect gross differences between centralized and decentralized 
labor markets, they may  not depict accurately differences  in the operation of 
markets between specific countries,  Caveat esptor. 
comparing measures of  labor market_structure 
This said, how closely linked are union density and industry dispersion  to 
one another and to  widely used indices of corporatism or  other categorizations 
of labor market institutions? 
As a first step to answering these questions I  calculated correlation 
coefficients between the union densities  in table 1 and industry wage 
dispersions  in Table 2, obtaining values ranging from -030  to -056, and 
calculated correlations between 1970-1980 changes in density and in 1973-84 
changes in dispersion, obtaining a coefficient of  0.36.  The correlations show 
that wage  dispersion contains information beyond that captured by  union 
density  and conversely.  Second, I  compared dispersion and union density 
across countries according to widely used  corporatist indices.  Most countries 
classified by Cohn  Crouch (1985) as  corporatist and,  ipso facto, by Bruno and 
Sachs  (1986),  who rely on  Crouch's work, have high union density and low wage Table 3:  Regression Coefficients and Standard Errors 
For the Relation ofg5oUnemper 
Area:  US vs UK 
UK (61 counties)  US (50 states) 
dependant  log  Rate  log  Rate 
variables  weekly wage  of  average  of 
of male  unemployment  hourly mfg  unemployment 
manual  1985  earnings  1985 
workers  1979-85 
1979-85 
pendant  variables 
t  unemployment 
- .92  - .43 
rate  (.27)  (.30) 
log wage/earnings  .03  .11 
1985  (.06)  (.02) 
Other variables 
% employed mfg  x  x  x  x 
education of  x  x  x  x 
workforce a) 
2 
R  .39  .51  .25  .51 
Source:  UK  data from 
US data from US Statistical Abstract various editions. 
Notes: 
a)  UK  education measured by 
US  education measured by  median years of  schooling dispersion,  producing a sizeable positive correlation between a corporatist 
dummy variable and density (r— 0.45) and  a negative correlation between it  and 
dispersion  (r— -0.47).  Still, the relations are far from perfect: Relgium and 
Australia,  rated low in  corporatism, are high  in unionism while 'corporatist' 
Austria has high wage dispersion.  Third,  I correlated union density in 1980 
and industry dispersion in 1984/5 with  Calmfors and Driffills' ranking of 
countries by centralization of  wage-setting and found that those at the top of 
their list (with low ratings) were more  unionised (r — -0.71)  and had lower 
wage dispersion  (r  — 0.37).  The relatively small correlation between wage 
dispersion  and centralization is due to  Austria, which they rank as number one 
in centralization while it has,  as noted, high  wage dispersion.  (6) 
The union density and dispersion of industry wage indicators of  labor 
market structures have three advantages over judgmental categorisations: they 
are based on  hard' statistics; they vary over  time in a natural way: and they 
lead one to look in  close at actual wage  outcomes and union representation. 
The disadvantage is that they are a step removed from the corporatist/central- 
ized wage  setting and flexible market concepts that underlie the debate over 
alternative  labor market arrangements.  As they have both  advantages and 
disadvantages,  in  ensuing analyses I use them and judgmental categorisations of 
institutions to indicate the nature of the labor market structures that may 
affect  outcomes,  First, however, it is necessary  to delineate country 
differences in  outcomes and examine the labor demand relation that constrains 
employment  and wage outcomes, 
II. Outcomes and Constraints 
As the divergent views of  American/European  economic success given at  the 
outset indicates, choice of  Outcomes tS critical  in comparing performance.  One 
can get different pictures of  economic performance by focusing on  growth as 
opposed to levels of outcomes; selecting one indicator rather than another; 10010  4 
Indtrators  of  'Se icrco1. Ferfaroanre 
Erny/  Change  1Q-8Clange flyL 
15-64  roy 1' 64  Corey  JOarge  Indee of COP 
0100  rICO  Rate  ir inc  real ODP/  real hourly 
1164  19'3-84  0064  1073.84  real COP  ranker  jflnsef  L!pjta  Per  employee 
00  66.0  3  3  74  2 6  27  .05  04  100  100 
7.00  64.6  -6.1  13.0  10.0  15  .16  19  72  71 
Japan  70.7  -0.1  2.7  14  .46  32  .39  60  75 
Ceroany  59.4  -6.7  8.5  7.8  22  .27  .18  86  94 
France  56  6  -6 4  9  7  7.1  25  .25  .32  82  95 
Italy  53 9  -2  2  10 2  4.0  .23  .13  25  65  79 
Canada  64.7  0.2  11.2  57  33  .06  .09  99  101 
Australia  63.8  -4.6  8.9  7.6  34  19  11  81  87 
Austria  63 1  -5.0  3.8  2.7  .28  .18  .30  79 
Belgium  55.3  -6.7  14.0  11.3  .20  .22  .35  79 
lreuearb  73.5  -3.7  8.5  6.8  .23  .17  .20  87  81 
FInland  73 4  3.4  6.1  3.8  33  .19  18  80  72 
Ireland  52.5  -7.4  15.5  9.8  .42  .35  .29  52  73 
Netherlands  53.7  -4.6  14.0  3.8  .17  .09  .12  76  94 
New Zealand  61.3  -3.1  5.7  5.5  .20  .07  .09  69  28 
Norway  74.3  7.5  3.0  3.5  .46  .24  .19  500  95 
Spain  43.7  -16.2  20.1  17.6  .24  dO  .61  54  87 
Sweden  78  8  4.2  3.1  0  3  .21  .10  .00  99  88 
Iwitrerland  70 6  -7.1  1.1  0.7  .08  12  .13  103  96 
SOURCES:  Parebasing  Power Parity  from DECO.  See HOard, (19853 and  P. Hill. 
(1986). 
DECO,  Historical  St.tistles  1960-84.  (i986.c) 
006,  Cenrer  for Labor  Economics.  DECO  Sara Set (revised and 
updated,  1987). 
NOTES  a.  Unemployment  rates  are  standardized  DECO  rates where  available. 
narlonai  rates otherwise. Swiss  onemploymenr,i9?S-84. 
B.  Hourly  earnings  is verified,  deflated  by  GOP  deflator. 
o.  Purchasing  power  parry dollars,  see Ward  and Hill. 8 
comparing  changes over one period rather than another, and so  on (e.g.  "manu- 
facturing productivity  is rising rapidly in the U.K." versus "employment is 
below  1979 levels").  To  deal with this problem I present in  Table 4 data on 
levels and changes in  several outcomes,  Columns 1-4 show the divergence in 
employment/working  age population and unemployment rates among OECD countries 
that has attracted most attention.  The unemployment  figures document the shift 
of the U.S.  from relatively high to relatively low unemployment while the 
employment/population  ratios show the growth of  employment in  the US, Sweden 
and some other countries compared to the drop in the France, UK, Germany, among 
others.  The column  5 evidence shows that despite differences  in labor 
utilization, GD? did not increase that differently across countries.  The 
'reason' is indicated in column 6's change  in labor productivity (GDP per 
employee) and column  7's change in real wages, which are inversely related 
across countries to growth of  employment (compare US and Sweden with Belgium 
and UK).  If one adjusts the productivity growth  figures for the 1975-1986 4-9% 
decline in annual hours worked in Europe compared to the US (OECD 1987), 
moreover, the difference in  productivity growth between  the US and OECD  Europe 
becomes even more pronounced,  One uncommon interpretation of  the US-Europe 
experience  in the 1970s-],980s  is that Americans had to  work more to obtain 
similar increases in living standard, and thus that  high  employment America did 
not perform as  well as low employment Europe, save for workaholics. 
Columns 8 and 9 turn to levels of  performance.  They contrast GD? per 
capita and GD? per worker across countries in  OECD  purchasing power parity 
units.  These figures show greater similarity in  GD? per worker than  in GD? per 
capita, due to the fact that countries with  low employment/population rates 
have correspondingly  higher productivity.  This presumably reflects increases 
in  measured productivity as employment falls along production  functions.  Note 
also  that, concern about Japanese productivity notwithstanding, GDP per  worker 9 
is lower in Japan than in Europe and the US.  As  Americans (and Japanese) work 
more  hours than Europeans (7).  moreover,  Europe looks even better  in output per 
hour:  British hourly output, for example  exceeded Japanese by  8% while  French 
and German hourly outputs were virtually the same as  American. 
From the perspective of  labor market analysis it is the relations between 
employment/unemployment performance  and productivity/real wages in Table 4 that 
are most intriguing.  In  a period in  which GDP growth did not differ greatly 
among countries (could not differ much  because of  economic and technological 
interdependence?) the differing performance of countries along  these two 
dimensions raises the possibility  that their economies faced similar wage/ 
employment  trade-off schedules, of  the sort often modelled by  labor demand, 
though also explicable in other ways (Solow 1986)  and thus that thfferences  in 
employment reflect in part the position of countries along that schedule. 
wage employment trade-off: aggregate evidence 
The standard method for analysing the impact of wages on  employment  across 
countries is to  estimate time series demand relations for individual countries, 
and to  use differences in estimated response parameters to account for 
differences in  performances (e.g. the 1986 Unemployment Economica Supplement). 
My approach in  this section is different.  I  take changes in wages and 
employment across countries (industries) over the same period rather than time 
series changes within a country as units of  observation.  I use the same 
equation  for all countries, and thus attribute differing Outcomes among 
countries  to different changes in explanatory variables  rather than  to 
differing response parameters.  To finesse issues of  dynamic adjustments, 
moreover,  I take changes over long periods. 
Formally, my  analysis can be  represented by the following employment 
(demand) equation: 
dlnEc — a dln%Jc  +  b  dlnXc + uc,  (1) 10 
where din is the log change operator; E is employment; Wc  are wages; X is a 
demand-shift variable; u is a residual; the subscript c indexes country. 
If  one assumes that each country has its own response parameters, a + ac 
and b  + bc,  where a and  b are the mean responses and ac and  bc  are the country- 
specific components,  then the latter are subsumed into the residual: 
dinEc —  (a  +  ac)  dlnWc + (b + bo)  dlnXc # uc  —  (2) 
a DlnWc + b  DlnXc + at  DlnWc + bc DlnXc +uc, 
where  a and b are average response parameters. 
In (2) heterogeneity  in  responses creates heteroskedastic  errors  but does 
not bias  estimates of  parameters as long as the country components are 
independent of the other variables in the equation.  Material and related 
prices  that are determined on world markets and whose changes are likely to be 
similar across countries are subsumed in the constant term. 
results 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating relations between changes in 
employment, real wages, and output for the entire economy in 19  OECD countries 
and for manufacturing  in 12 countries over different time periods.  In panels A 
and & the dependent variable is total employment, output is real GD?, and wages 
are manufacturing earnings (A) or  compensation of employees from national 
product accounts per employee deflated by the GDP deflator  (E);  and changes are 
measured as in changes over the entire period.  In Panel C the dependent 
variable is total hours worked  in manufacturing, output  is value added in 
manufacturing, and wages are total compensation for manufacturing production 
workers deflated by  GDP deflator; because the BLS publishes the data as 
compound annual changes, changes are measured in those units. 
All three Sets of  calculations show  that, conditional on  the growth of 
output, changes in wages and employment were significantly inversely related, 
The US  and Sweden, for example, with  below-average real wage growth had  above- Table  5:  Regression  Coefficients and Standard Errors 
For the Impact  of Real Wages and OupU.on Employment 
..  period 
Change  in Ln  Change in 
Real 1age  In  GD? 
1960-73  -.57 (.11)  .62  (.14) 
1973-79  -.45 (.11)  .71  (.17) 
1979-84  - .54  (.15)  .62  (.19) 
B)  Dependent Variable:  Change  in Ln 
Change  in ln  Real  Change  in  R2 
Labor  Costs  in GD? 
Source:  Panels A and  B,  19 OECD  countries from  CLE-OECD data  set, as in  table 
4.  Panel C, 12 Countries  (US,  Canada,  Japan,  France, Germany, Italy,  UK, 
Belgium,  Denmark, Netherlands,  Norway, and Sweden) as given by  A. Neef (1986), 
with  wages  deflated by GNP deflator, using OECD  data. 





1960-73  -.76  (.05)  .90 (.07)  .94 
1973-79  -.62  (.10)  .75 (.13)  .74 
1979-84  -.53  (.16)  .88 (.22)  .53 
C) Dependent Variable:  Compound Annual Change in  Total Hours  in Mfg 
in period 
Compound  Annual  Compound Annual  R2 
Change  in Mfg  Change  in Mfg 
Compensation  Output 
1960-73  -.53 (.08)  .62  (.08)  .86 
1973-79  -.89 (.22)  .36  (.22)  .67 
1979-85  -.75 (.24)  .80 (.13)  .81 11 
average growth of  employment.  Eecause rates of  growth of  GDF vary less than 
rates of  growth of  real wages, moreover, the wage-employment  trade-off tells a 
greater part  of  the story of  variation  in employment performance across 
countries  than do  differences  in rates of  GDP growth although the latter are 
critical  in explaining differences, as well. 
8y directly linking changes in employment and wages across countries,  the 
calculations in  Table S provide a potentially  firmer basis for attributing 
differences  in employment growth  to differences in  wage-settlements  than time- 
series  regressions  that rely on  differences  in estimated response parameters  of 
questionable  robustness.  Still, one must take care in  interpreting the 
results.  With  output fixed, the estimates neglect  the 'scale' effect of  wages 
on  output and employment and thus may understate  the employment consequences  of 
wages.  To  gage the importance of  this I correlated changes in  real wages  and 
GD? across countries, obtaining positive coefficients  inconsistent with  the 
notion  that wage-induced output expansion is a major determinant of  different 
country experiences.  A second potential error arises because labor costs are a 
major share of  value added, possibly producing a spurious negative employment. 
wage tradeoff (8).  As regressions using industry data with gross output  (where 
labor's share is small) or value  added minus labor costs as the measure of 
production  yield results similar to those in  the table, I also doubt that this 
is a major  problem.  Finally, as Solow  (1986) has stressed, there are other 
ways to interpret  the observed wage-employment  trade-off beyond  wage-induced 
movements  along demand curves.  One such interpretation  is in  terms of  the 
joint determination  of  wages and employment  on an aggregate production  function 
due to changes in  GD?.  As this implies a negative correlation between  changes 
in  GDP and  wages, contrary to fact, I  reject  it as  the primary explanation of 
the observed relations.  Another possibility  is that the trade-off reflects the 
impact of exogenous changes in  productivity on  real wages or on  money  wages and 12 
prices  through both labor aod product market behavior.  While  I  believe 
observed cross-country differecces  in growth of  output per worker  are roo large 
to represeot longrun differences fn  technology among rhe countries,  the problem 
of endogeneity of  wages  remains, for factors that influence wages  (and the 
markup  of  prices over wages)  are unlikely to be independent of  growth of  GD? 
and employment and unemployment.  In sum, although none of  the criticisms 
gainseys  the empirical  'trade-off', they raise questions about  its 
interpretation and meaning.  To  probe  these issues I  examine wage  and 
employment  changes with  more disaggregate data. 
induendence 
There are three advantages  to studying changes in  wages  and employment 
across  disaggregated industries,  First, it allows us to analyse employment and 
wages  among fndustries within countriea and thus to probe rhe postulated 
similarity of  demand behavior that underlies equation I,  Second, it offers 
ways to  deal with the problem of endogeneiry of  output and  prices  by  exploiting 
developments  in foreign countries.  Third,  it makes the interpretation  of the 
tradeoff as joint wage  and employment determination along a production  function 
less plausible, given the differing situations of  specific  industries. 
Accordingly, 
I  obtained data  on  wages, employment, value added,  and production 
for 10  countries and up to 37 industries  from an  EEC file (9);  and on 
employment, wages, value added and gross output in  producers prices  for up to 
35 industries in  17 countries from  the UN  Yearbook of  Industrial  Statistics. 
The UN  ssisple consists primarily of  manufacturing industries, while  the EEC 
data includes some other sectors.  As in the country comparisons,  I  examine 
changes over long periods. 
alternative models 
I use the following three equation model of  price,  output, and employment 
determination to  analyse the industry data: 13 
Wage-Price Relation: 
dinPic — dinPiw;  (3A) 
dinPic — vicdl,nWic-dlnTic,  (33) 
where P Is price; v is labor's cost  share; T represents neutral technological 
progress;  i  indexes industry; c indexes country; and w indexes the world. 
In (3A)  the price  in industry  I  in country c depends on world  market 
prices and is thus exogenous  to the  labor market. 
In (38),  by  contrast,  the price in an  Industry responds to wages according 
to labor's share in  value added. 
Which assumption Is more  plausible?  For some industries and countries, 
prices  are presumably  largely exogeneous  to the labor market because of inter- 
national competition  (or other reasons);  for others, the opposite may  be true. 
In  the absence of  a detailed pricing model,  prudence dictates analysis of  both. 
Demand for Output:  dinQic — -y dinPic + dlnXic,  (4) 
where y is the elasticity  of  product demand; and X is a shift in  demand  for 
output  in Industry 1 in country c taken as  exogenous. 
SubstitutIng 33 into 4 yields  a relation between wages  and output: dlnQic 
-yvdlnWic + ydlnlic  + dlnXic.  In 3A  wages have no impact on  output. 
Demand for Labor:  dlnEic — -hdlnWic  + dlnXic + cdlnTic,  (5) 
where  the elasticity h embodies substitution and scale effects; X is an 
exogeneous shift due to  shifts  in product demand; T reflects technology. 
The major problem with  models of this type is the absence of  measures of 
shifts  in demand, which  forces  researchers to  use actual output or instruments 
to proxy  shifts.  This  creates problems due to the endogeneity of  output 
through the production  function and the uncertain quality of instruments, 
Cross-country data  on  the same industries allows us to treat the problem by 
decomposing  the shift component  into country-specific,  industry-specific, and 
residual  interaction effects: 14 
dinTic — dlnTc + dlnTi  + vie;  dlnxic — dlnxc + dlnxi + eic  (6) 
Then,  pooling industry snd country data, one can  use industry dummy 
variables  to identify industry shifts (dlnTi and dlnxi) and country dummies to 
identify country shifts (dlnTc and dlnXc), eliminating  endogenous output: 
dlnEic  -hdlnWic + D'  + C'+  residual,  (7) 
where D' is a vector of industry dummies, C'  is a vector of  country dummies and 
the ic subscripts relate  to industry and country respectively. 
With  two countries  this is equivalent to comparing differences  in changes 
in employment  and differences in  changes in wages.  If  labor demand  behavior 
dominates  the data, the country whose  industry has a greater increase in wsges 
will have a smaller increase in employment. 
Alternatively,  the change  in industry production  in  all countries can be 
used  to  proxy shifts  in demand  in an  industry, yielding: 
dlnEic  — -hdlnWic + edlnQi'+  C',  (8) 
where  Qi'  is the sum of  production in  industry i in  the countries under study. 
This equation asks "what is the impact of  changes in wages on  employment  given 
world expansion of the industry, and employment trends in  the country?" 
results 
Analysis  of  thE relation between chsnges in  employment and  wages by 
industry in the EEC and UN  data sets confirms the existence of a significant 
wage-employment  tradeoff across and  within countries.  Specifically: 
(1) Regressions of  changes in employment on  changes in  wages  and output by 
industry within countries,  auzsissrized in appendix tables Al and A2, yield 
negative  coefficients on  wages of similar magnitudes  among countries  in  both 
the EEC and UN data sets.  The similarity justifies  pooling the dats into s 
single  cross-country  industry file in  ensuing analysis.  As  wage-setting 
institutions are more likely to differ across  countries  than labor demand 15 
behavior  moreover, I  interpret the results as reflecting similar demand 
elasticities  rather than some other similarity  in behavior. 
(2)  Whether one assumes that industry prices are exogeneously set on  world 
markets or  depend on industry wages in a country does not affect the inverse 
employment/wage  relation.  This is shown in  the EEC regressions in table Al, 
where the regressions on  the left hand side use wages and value added deflated 
by sector prices as explanatory variables  (on the assumption  that prices are 
determined  on world markets> while the regressions  on the right hand side use 
wages  and value added in  current values as  explanatory variables  (on the 
assumption  that prices depend on  wages).  Both regressions yield compatable 
negative  coefficients on  wages. 
(3)  Regression  estimates of the impact of relative wages  on eniployrnent 
using pooled  country-industry data  yield a significant  inverse employment/wage 
relation when  output is replaced by  industry and country dummy variables or by 
'world' output and country dummy variables.  This is documented in  Table  6 for 
the EEC (lines 1-4> and UN (lines 5-8> data sets,  Lines I and S give 
baseline'  estimates from regression of  changes in  employment  on changes in 
wages and output.  Lines 2 and 6 give results when  country and industry dummy 
variables have  been  added to  allow for differences  across countries and 
industries.  Lines 3 and 7 show  the results whenindustry output  is excluded as 
endogenous.  Here, the estimated elasticity  falls rather than rises, possibly 
because industry-country  specific technological or  demand shifts lead to 
expanded production and higher  wages as  workers share in industry prosperity, 
Finally, lines 4 and  8  replace industry dummy variables with changes in  output 
in  the countries  in the sample, with little effect  on  the estimates, 
In  sum, regardless of  whether one uses domestic output, industry and 
country dummies or 'world' output  to control for shifts in demand, the data 
reveal a substantial wage-employment  trade-off  in  industries across countries, Pooled  Cross-Country Estimates of 
JmptofRea1  Wages on Employment Among Industries 
A.  EEC Data Set 
dlnW/Pc  dlnQ)C  dlnw  Country  Industry 
Dummies  Dummies 
1.  '—0.46  0.68  e.65 
(0.07)  (0.04 
2.  —0.53  0.50  /  0.83 
(0.09)  (0.05) 
—0.30  0.69 
(0, ii) 
4  —034  0.60  /  0.55 
(&l2  (0.07) 
.  UN  Data Set 
5.  —0.50  0.61  Q.61 
(0.05)  (0.02) 
6.  —0.60  O.72 
(O.07  (0.03) 
38 
8.  —0.22  .62  o.32 
(0.12)  ..05) 
Note:  All  industry wages, value added,  and gross output are deflated by 
country GD? deflator. 16 
international competitiveness 
The pooled  industry-country data also allow us to examine the effects of 
exchange  rates and unit labor cost on employment by regressing changes in 
employment  on changes in wages,  exchange rates (nominal units of  currency per 
dollar)  (10), and  world output  in an industry (measured in dollar  terms) or 
industry dusrinies; and on  changes  in unit labor costs  (wages x employment/real 
value  added), exchange rates, aid world output or industry dummies,  As 
exchange  rates are country-specific  I  replaced country dummy variables with 
changes  in country GDP to measure domestic market developments.  I  limit 
analysis  to  the EEC data because  the UN data  has no sectoral prices. 
The estimated positive coefficients  on exchange rates in lines 1 and 2 of 
Table  7 indicate that,  as one would expect, industries in countries where  the 
currency  depreciated relative to the dollar  increased employment.  The similar 
magnitudes  of  the wage and exchange rate coefficients suggest, furthur, that 
wages  have to change by roughly the same rate as exchange rates to  offset 
currency  fluctuations on  employment.  As labor is only part of  costs,  this may 
understate  the required wage  adjustment  unless other costs move with wages. 
Lines  3-4 yield very  different  results for unit labor costs,  as declines 
in unit labor costs either  reduce  (line 3) or  have no  effect  (line 4) on 
employment.  The implication is that measure declines in unit labor costs, 
widely  viewed as an  indicator of increased competitiveness  and thus something 
'good', are more  likely to  reflect extensive shedding of labor  than 
technological  advance or wage  declines  that raise employment.  Indicative of 
this, Ireland and e1gium, whose employment  fell sharply, are among  the 
countries  with  the greatest 'improvement'  in  unit  labor costs, 
To sum up,  the evidence in  this section reveals that the major  differences 
in labor market performance  among countries  in the l970s and l980s -  -  in 
employ9nent  and growth of real wages 
- - were  inversely related in a labor demand Table7;  Estimates of  the Impact of  Exchange Rates 
and Wages on Employment Crowth Across Countries  (EEC Data) 
dInW  d1nULC  dinER  d1nGNP  d1nWVA  Industry 
Dummies 
1.  —0,23  C.19  .l2  .62  0.33 
(.08)  (.06)  (.10)  (.09) 
2.  —0.17  0.18  .05 
(.06)  (.05)  (.07)  0,65 
0.02  0.09  0.73  0.59 
(.05)  (.04)  (.19)  (09) 
4.  o.12  0.07  0.63  /  0.67 
(.05)  (.03)  (.14)  V 
Note  :  W = earnings;  ULC — unit labor costs, defined as (wages x 
employment)/Value  added in constant prices.  ER = exchange  rate in  units of 
currency per dollar; CNP = Cross  National Product in country; WVA = 'world 
value  added'  defined as sum of  value added in industry in all countries  in the 
data set. 17 
type trade-off.  Countries  like the U.S. or  Sweden where real wages  increased 
slowly had more rapid growth of  employment and higher employment-population 
rates than  countries with  rapid growth of real wages.  While  it is possible to 
interpret  this finding in ways other than  that suggested here,  the trade-off 
represents  the basic  fact that any explanation of  the divergence  in outcomes 
must address. 
III.  Institutional  Differences and Outcomes 
The question  that arises next is whether the differences  in outcomes 
across  countries  examined in  section II are related to  the labor market 
institutions examined  in  section I?  Do countries with  one set of institutions 
perform differently  than  countries with other institutions? 
Extant  empirical analyses offer, as noted, conflicting  answers.  Some 
studies  interpret the post oil-shock economic record as  showing the success of 
'corporatist' economies  (Crouch,1985; Bruno and Sachs 1986; Tarantelli  1986; 
Bean, Layard, and  Nickell,1986;  Newell and Symons 1986).  Others  see better 
economic  performances  among countries with  decentralized flexibility or  with 
particular  kinds  of  flexible labor market  arrangements (Klau and Mittelstadt 
1986;  Freeman and Weitzman,l986;  Bruno and Sachs,1986 with respect to nominal 
wage responsiveness).  The failure of  several follow-up analyses to confirm 
initial claims  about the effect of institutions, seemingly because of  modest 
differences  in performance  measures and  periods covered (Van Poeck,l987; 
Summers and Wadwhani,1987;  my  calculations (11)), suggest the danger of 
generalizing  from  results based on  a particular  model and data  set, 
Accordingly,  in  this section  I  eschew estimating structural  models  of behavior 
under  constraints  in  favor of 'reduced form' regressions  designed simply to 
identify the links between  indicators of  labor market  institutions  and 
employment  and wage  outcomes.  My  analysis suggests that one reason for 
conflicting  interpretations  of  the 1970s-1980s experience  is that there is an 18 
element of truth to  hoth sides of the corporatist/flexible  msrket debate: OECD 
countries with the most highly  sttuctured labor markets and those with the most 
decentralized  Isbor markets turned in  better  employment performances  thsn 
others.  My  analysis also reveals, however, a  wide range of  experience among 
countries  with 'similar' institutiona thst suggests that even statistically 
significant  and robust findings be interpreted with caution. 
empirical  finding 
Table  8 presents the results of  regression estimates of  the relation 
between  labor market  arrangements and employment and real wage  outcomes in the 
l9SOs.  Lines 1-3 are based on  the OECD country data whilie lines 4 and 5 are 
based on the BLS data used in  Table  5.  In each  calculation I relate outcome 
variables  to:  industry wage  dispersion figures from Table 2  and the aquare of 
those  figures, the 1979 percentage unioniaed  from Table 1,  a 0-I corporatist 
dummy variable  and the In  change  in output in  the country.  The key 
coefficients  are those on  dispersion, as they  are designed to reflect the 
impact of both  highly centralized  (low dispersion) and decentralized  (high 
dispersion)  labor market arrangements on  outcomes.  If the two labor market 
structures  produce similar outcomes, the equation will  have a parabolic  form, 
with  linear  and squared terms obtaining opposite signs in  the regressions. 
The regressions  for employment/population in  line 1 show  that in fact this 
is the case for overall labor utilisation: the level of dispersion has a 
negative  impact on  employment while its square has a positive  impact, 
indicating  that increases in dispersion are first associated with  falling then 
with  rising  employment/population  rates, and thus that both  countries with 
centralized  and those with  decentralized labor markets generated  more 
employment  than others.  The unemployment regression  in  line 2  shows the same 
pattern with  oppositely signed  coefficients, as one would expect, though  the 
parabolic  form  has less statistical significance.  That the cross-section 19 
pattern is not simply the result of long-standing country differences  in labor 
utilization  is indicated by the coefficients on  the dispersion terms  in the 
change in  employment/population  regression in  line 3.  At least part  of the 
198(e cross-Section differences result  from differential country responses to 
the l980s economic environment. 
As for the other labor market  indicators, the percentage union has modest 
generally  insignificant effects on the three outcomes while  the corporatist 
dummy obtains generally significant  coefficients, indication that those 
economies  did better in  employment and unemployment, even  with the levels of 
di ersion  and unionism held fixed.  Itt all cases,  finally, changes  in output 
raised employment or  reduced unemployment 
To provide a better picture of the parabolic pattern in  the data  and to 
show  the variation among countries around  fitted values,  I  graph  in Figure 1 
the predicted and actual 1984 employment/population  rates against the level of 
dispersion.  The figure shows  the  cross-country differences  that underlie  the 
regression  results and the substantial  variation around the regression  fit that 
leads me to be circumspect  in drawing conclusions.  In  regressions with  country 
observations  residuals like those shown in the graph cannot be ignored on  the 
principle  that 'social science always has residuals': an  aberrant country is a 
genuine counter-example  (unlike an  outlier in individual data files); and there 
are several in the scatter, 
Turning to  the 8LS data, the regression  in line 4 shows  that changes in 
total hours  in  manufacturing  is related parabolically  to dispersion while 
having  no  connection to the other indicators of  labor market  structure.  Line 
5 shows the opposite relation between dispersion and  changes  in real 
compensation  in manufacturing,  with the level of dispersion entering with  a 
positive  coefficient and its square entering  with  a  negative coefficient.  This 
pattern  implies that increased dispersion  is associated  first with  rising, then Table  8:  Regression  Coefficients and Standard Errors  for 
Relation  Between Indicators of  Labor Market 
Structure and Employuent and Wages 1979-85 
Data  Set and 
2  2 
Dependent Variables  DISP  DISP  %UNION  CORP  ln  R 
output 
a 
OECD  19 Countries  _______________________________________________________________ 
1.  Emp/15-614  1984  -10.94  0.26  -0.07  5.99  630  0.74 
(2.82  (0.07)  (008)  (2.65)  (23.3) 
2. Unernp,  1984  3.02  -0.07  0.09  -5.41  -49.5  0.64 
(1.89)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (1.78)  (15.7) 
3. 1n  Rap/pop,  -3.47  0.08  -0.03  3.98  31.1  0.48 
1979-84  (2.13)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (2.00)  (17.6) 
BLS 12 Countries 
4. Compound annual  -10.36  0.30  -0.12  8.48  0.44  0.80 
Change  Total hours  (5.4)  (0.16)  (0.21)  (11.67  <0.24) 
mfg 1979-85 
5.  Compound annual  11.3  -0.39  -0.08  -4.28  0.44  0.60 
Change  in Hourly  <4.70)  (0.14)  <0.19)  (10.1)  (0.21) 
Compensation 
Source: 
DISP, lines 1-3 based  on UN  data from table 2  with figures for 
Switzerland  and the Netherlands proxied by  Germany on  the basis 
of the similarly shown in other data  sets, and the figures on 
France estimated  at 1 point below that in  Germany in 1983 than 
Germany on the basis of figures reported by the Swedish 
Employers Federation,  as given in  Klau and Mittelstadt. 
lines 4-5 based on  BLS data from table 2 
with  ILO figure used  for Norway (10) 
%  Union,  1979 figures from table 1 
CORP, 0-1 corporatist  dummy from Crouch  <1985) 
Notes: 
a) All dependant variables  multiplied by 100 so to reduce numbers of 


































FlL8  1: 
The  Relation  Between  the Dispersion 
of Eirings Across  Industries  and 
EmpLoyment/PopulatiOn. 
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Italy  Netherlands 
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13  14  15  16  17  13  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28 
Dispersion  in 
Wages (xIOO) 
x  represents  actual  Employment/PoPulation  16—64  IZ/P) 
represents  predicted  El? (from  flegression Equation) 20 
with falling real wage,  as one would expect if  the lahoc market  institutions 
affect  employment  along the employment-real wage trade-off schedule.  As I 
could  find no such  pattern in  the hourly  pay figures in  the OECD data, I am 
unwilling  to make much  of this result.  Even the ELS data show, moreover, 
greater divergence  in  changes in real wages than in employment  across countries 
with 'similar' labor market  inatitutions, suggesting  that the existence of 
country differences  in the teal wage-employment  trade-off  that are subsumed in 
error terms  in our regreasions. 
IV  Summary 
This paper has four messages  regarding labor market  institutions, 
constraints, and outcomes in  DECO  countries  in the l970s and lYEOs: 
1) Labor  market institutions diverged markedly in  the period  under study: 
union  density increased in  many  countries but declined  sharply in  the US and 
moderately  in some  others; industrial wage dispersion  rose in several less 
unionised  countries,  including the US, fell in  Italy, while holding  steady in 
several highly  unionised  countries. 
2) The level and change  in employment-to-population  rates and change in 
real wages  differed among countries and among industries  within  countries along 
a trade-off  schedule that suggests that movements along demand  curves were an 
important factor  in the divergence  in  outcomes  in the period. 
3) Labor market  institutions were related to outcomes  in  a nonlinear  way, 
with  countries having  centralized  institutions/low wage  dispersion  and 
countries having  decentralized  institutions/high wage  dispersion  doing better 
in limiting unemployment  and maintaining  employment  than countries with 
intermediate labor market  institutions. 
4) There  is sufficient  diversity among countries  with 'comparable' 
inatitutiona to indicate that desireable, or  undesireable,  outcomes  are not the 
exclusive property of any single labor market arrangement,  possibly  because  all 21 
have  the potential  for adopting the  'right' or 'wrong' policies  to attain 
feasible outcomes. 
Finally, it is  important to  recognize  that the cross-country  analysis in 
this and other studies leaves  open the issue of  exportability'  of institutions 
-  -  the  extent  to which labor market  arrangments  developed  in one country can  be 
transferred  to others.  Centralized  corporatist  labor markets  are found 
primarily  in small countries.  Decentralized markets characterize  larger 
economies,  Perhaps  whatever  its virtue,  'corporatist' wage-setting  could not 
flourish  in economies  like the US or  the UK  as it does in Sweden  and Denmark; 
and conversely  for ducentralized  systems  in smaller economic settings.  If this 
is the case,  the issue to be addressed  in the future ought not to be which 
broad  set of labor market  arrangements  'work better' but rather which specific 
policies  and programs work and can  be transfered  to other countries. 22 
Endnotes 
I) There  are several sources of  data on  unionisation:  union reports of 
membership,  enterpise  reports on  collective bargaining;  household surveys;  and 
union  financial  records.  Among  the problems with  these different data  are: the 
tendency  for unions  to  exaggerate membership in some  periods (recognized  as a 
problem with  U.K.  statistics in the 1980s); lack of knowledge of collective 
bargaining  status  (by household recipients reporting  on  other recipients); 
unwillingness  to make data  public  (in countries where  dual unions  compete) 
.  In 
the U.S.  the Department  of  Labor terminated its survey  of  unions  and now 
reports  figures from household  data. 
2) Tn  the caee of  France, figures on the proportion  of  workers covered by 
industry-level  agreements suggest much higher  union  influence, while  those on 
the proportion  covered by  plant-level agreements  are consistent with  the low 
density shown  in  the table. aee Ministere du Travail  1986. 
3) For example,  the Workplace  Industrial Relations  Survey  reports that the 
proportion  of  private manufacturing establishments  with  no recognized union 
rose from  35% to 44% between  1980 and 1984  (Millward and Stevens, 1986 p.  62) 
while  the New Earnings Survey  shows a fall in  the percentage of male  workers 
covered by  collective  bargaining  from 74% in  1973 to  64% in 1984. 
4) Several points of  caution here.  First, it is possible  for wage structures 
to change while  wage dispersion  remains fixed-- if for instance, high  and low 
wage industries  simply change position.  As wage structures show  persistence of 
rank order,  however,  this is not a serious problem.  Second, wage  dispersion 
could be high  but all wages change  in concert.  This would show up in  different 
orderings  of  countries by dispersion and dispersion  of  changes. 
5) Calculations  in  which I sued the same number of industries for all countries 
did not alter any of  the findings in  the table. 23 
6) The calculations are based on relating  the dispersion figures from the UN 
data to the union densities  from table  1.  I  made one slight modification  in 
the Chalafors  and Driffill's  ranking, giving Ireland the same ranking as the 
UK, while  they left out Ireland. 
7) Annual  hours worked: 2043 in Japan;  1888 in US.; 1723 in  the U.K.;  1678 in 
Germany  and 1630 in  France, according  to the OEGD, 1986 
8) If labor costs were all of value added, then ln  employment  would be 
perfectly  negatively  related to in  wages,  holding ln value added fixed, with  a 
coefficient  of  one. 
9) This  data  set was provided to me by  Ms. Dewatripont of the University  of 
Bruxelles,  whose work  with  V. Ginsberg  and Dewatripont  reveals a significant 
wage-employment  tradeoff in  time series analyses of these data for several 
European  countries,  (Ginsberg and Dewatripont, 1987) 
10) It is  appropriate in  cross-country  analysis to measure exchange rates  and 
wages in  nominal units as we  are comparing  changes in rates  in one country 
relative  to those in other countries. 
11) 1 find  no  relation between  indices of  corporatism or  nominal wage 
responsiveness  and the outcome measures  Crouch and  Bruno and Sachs use in  their 
analyses  in the 1979-84 period. 24 
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;nt  rv 
ry  d1;/P  v  din k/P  dm74  R2 
Sid  iced 
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(0.11)  (0.08)  (0.33)  (0.07) 
France  —0.47  0.86  0.61  —0.61  0.57  0.50 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0,29)  (0.14) 
Italy  —0.56  0.63  0.51  —0.49  0.64  0.51 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.15) 
United  Kingdom  —0.63  0.61  0.66  —0.74  0.55  0.61) 
(0.18)  (0.11)  (0.38)  (0.11) 
Netherlands  —0.34  0.86  0.76  —0.66  0.63  0.69 
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by Country Across Industries 
UN Data 1973-83 
Country  dlnW  dinGo  R2 
United States  —0.78  0.61  0.73 
(0.23)  (007) 
Japan  —111  036  056 
(0.23)  (0.06) 
Germany  —0.36  0.60  0.83 
(0.37)  (0.05) 
Italy  —(1.53  0.57  0.80 
(0.15)  (0.07) 
United Kingdon  —0.62  0.78  0.93 
(0.32)  (0.04) 
Netherlands  —1.08  0.54  0.84 
(0.15)  (0,17) 
Denmark  —0.35  0.68  0.59 
(0.60)  (0.12) 
Ireland  —0,53  0,48  0.73 
(0.39)  (0.06) 
Australia  —0.34  0.70  0.63 
(0.15)  (0.10) 
Austria  —0.47  0.96  0.85 
(0.28)  (0,07) 
Canada  —0.26  0.57  0.80 
(0.24)  0.06 
Finland  —2.03  0.38  0,49 
(0.61)  (0.08) 
Norway  —0.53  0.89  0.97 
(0.38)  (0.03) 
New Zealand  1.05  0.74  0.70 
(0.69)  (0.11) 
Sweden  —0.66  0.60  0,79 
(0.70)  (0.06) 
Note: W is the ratio of wage and salary  bill to employees while CO is gross 
output 
- 